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Mommy Dearest:
Determining Parental Rights
and Enforceability of Surrogacy
Agreements
Honorable William J. Giacomo with Angela DiBiasi, Esq.

I. Introduction
Advances in reproduction technology raise difficult legal
questions concerning the enforceability of surrogacy parenting
agreements. By way of example, consider the recent divorce
and custody battle involving television talk show host and
comedian Sherri Shepherd. She and her then-husband entered
into a surrogacy agreement whereby a donor egg was fertilized
in vitro1 with the sperm of Shepherd’s husband, and later
implanted in a surrogate to carry the child.2 By this surrogacy
* Honorable William J. Giacomo (B.S. Boston College, J.D. Pace University
School of Law) is a Justice of the Supreme Court, 9th Judicial District and an
Adjunct Professor at Pace University. Angela DiBiasi, Esq. is a Principal
Court Attorney for the Supreme Court, 9th Judicial District.
* An earlier version of this article was originally published in the
July/August 2015 issue of the New York State Bar Association Journal.
1. See In vitro fertilization, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation (last visited Oct. 9, 2015).
In vitro fertilization . . . (IVF) is a process by which an egg is
fertilized by sperm outside the body in vitro (‘in glass’) . . . .
The fertilized egg (zygote) is cultured for 2-6 days in a
growth medium and is then implanted in the same or
another woman’s uterus, with the intention of establishing a
successful pregnancy.
Id.
2. See generally Hollie McKay, Can Sherri Shepherd Walk Away from
Unborn Surrogate Child?, FOX NEWS (July 22, 2014),
http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2014/07/22/can-sherri-shepherdwalk-away-from-unborn-surrogate-child/.
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arrangement, the egg donor and Sherri Shepherd’s husband
are the biological parents with a genetic tie to the resulting
child. After conception, Sherri Shepherd and her husband filed
for divorce. Shepherd is the financial “breadwinner” of the
marriage who does not want custody, parenting rights or child
support obligations based on the fact that she did not give birth
and has no genetic connection to the resulting child. These
legal proceedings are further complicated by the fact that
Sherri Shepherd filed for divorce in New Jersey (which has a
similar stance to New York in deeming surrogacy agreements
as unenforceable), while her husband filed for divorce in
California (which recognizes the enforceability of surrogacy
agreements).3 The laws governing surrogacy agreements in the
aforementioned states yield contrary results on the issue. The
governing law in this area is new and evolving and, as such,
the allocation of the legal rights and responsibilities depend on
which state has jurisdiction over the matter. This article will
discuss the basic types of surrogacy agreements and examine
the legal distinctions of their enforceability under New York
and California law.
II. Background on Surrogacy Agreements
There are two forms of surrogacy: gestational and
traditional. “In a gestational surrogacy, the surrogate mother
is not genetically related to the child. Eggs are extracted from
the intended mother or egg donor and mixed with sperm from
the intended father or sperm donor in vitro.”4 Sherri Shepherd
and her then-husband entered into a form of gestational
surrogacy agreement. As such, neither Sherri Shepherd nor
the surrogate have a genetic tie to the resulting child. In
contrast, under a traditional surrogacy agreement, “the
surrogate mother is artificially inseminated with the sperm of

3. See generally Andrea Peyser, Unborn Child Faces Uncertain Fate in
Sherri Shepherd’s Divorce War, N.Y. POST (July 14, 2014, 2:31 AM),
http://nypost.com/2014/07/14/unborn-child-faces-uncertain-fate-in-sherrishepherds-divorce-war/.
4. See Jenn Z., Definitions and Types of Surrogacy, SURROGATE MOTHERS
ONLINE, http://www.surromomsonline.com/articles/define.htm (last visited
Aug. 26, 2015).
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the intended father or sperm donor. The surrogate’s own egg
will be used, thus she will be the genetic mother of the
resulting child.”5
A written surrogacy agreement is usually executed by the
parties seeking a surrogate and the surrogate who will carry
the resulting child. The terms of the agreement include the
surrogate mother’s obligation to carry the child in exchange for
certain compensation paid to the surrogate. A traditional
surrogacy agreement, where the surrogate mother provides her
egg and is the biological mother of the resulting child, includes
a waiver whereby the surrogate agrees to terminate her
parental rights. The parties to a surrogacy agreement also
agree to specific terms regarding medical care, finances, travel
expenses, and the like to be paid by the parties seeking the
surrogate.6
III. Comparative Analysis of Enforceability of Surrogacy
Agreement
A. New York Law
The issue of surrogate parenting contracts has been a
controversial one in New York and action to address the issue
was commenced by the New York State Legislature in 1992 in
the wake of Matter of Baby M,7 after several lower courts in
New York reached somewhat conflicting determinations.8 The
Legislature enacted Domestic Relations Law § 122 effective
July 1993 to address the issue. The Matter of Baby M case
filed in New Jersey involved a traditional surrogacy parenting
agreement where

5. Id.
6. See generally Free Online Legal Forms from All Law – Family
Documents – Surrogate Parenting Agreement, ALLLAW, www.alllaw.com/
forms/family/surrogate_parenting (last visited Aug. 26, 2015) (examples of
traditional surrogacy agreements); see generally Sample Traditional
Surrogacy Contract, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE,
www.surromomsonline.com/articles/ts_contract.htm (last visited Aug. 26,
2015).
7. See In re Matter of Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
8. 45 N.Y. JUR. 2D DOM. REL. § 330.
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a married woman had been inseminated with . . .
a ‘purchasing’ father’s sperm who agreed to pay
the woman a $10,000 fee. After the birth of the
child, the woman refused to give up the child.
While the trial court decreed enforcement of the
surrogacy contract, the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the contract was unenforceable
as against public policy.9
New York subsequently codified Domestic Relations Law §
122, stating that “[s]urrogate parenting contracts are hereby
declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void
and unenforceable.”10 Domestic Relations Law § 121(4) defines
a “surrogacy parenting agreement” as an agreement in which
“(a) a woman agrees either to be inseminated with the sperm of
a man who is not her husband or to be impregnated with an
embryo that is the product of an ovum fertilized with the sperm
of a man who is not her husband; and (b) the woman agrees to,
or intends to, surrender or consent to the adoption of the child
born as a result of such insemination or impregnation.”11
Interestingly, the legislature did not state that such agreement
was entered into in exchange for any monetary compensation.
Furthermore, Domestic Relations Law §124 provides that “the
court shall not consider the birth mother’s participation in a
surrogate parenting contract as adverse to her parental rights,
status, or obligations”12 when determining parental issues
relating to the resulting child. In other words, the fact that the
surrogate mother bore a child pursuant to a surrogacy
agreement cannot be used against her in a court of law if she
seeks custody or parenting rights to the resulting child.
Referring back to Sherri Shepherd’s surrogacy scenario,
New York law (which is similar to New Jersey law) favors
Shepherd since New York deems surrogacy agreements void
and against public policy.
Shepherd, as the financial
9. Alan D. Scheinkman, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
122 (McKinney 2015).
10. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2015).
11. Id. § 121(4).
12. Id. § 124(1).
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‘breadwinner’ spouse, could be successful in avoiding child
support or parental obligations pertaining to the child resulting
from an unenforceable surrogacy agreement. Her ex-husband
and the egg donor, as the child’s biological parents, could
potentially be subject to statutory child support and parental
obligations.
Two cases involving parental rights of a stepparent and a
spouse in a same-sex couple raise related issues worth noting.
In Monroe Dept. of Social Services ex. rel. Palermo v. Palermo,13
the Monroe Department of Social Services appealed a Family
Court
Hearing
Examiner’s
determination
that
the
respondent/stepfather had no support obligations for his
stepchildren, although he was directed to maintain “family”
medical insurance coverage for his stepchildren. The court
ultimately held that the respondent/stepfather was not
obligated to pay child support for the stepchildren, absent
showing that the county social services department was unable
to recover support from the children’s biological fathers. In
this case, the biological fathers’ identities were known by the
social services department, and the court noted that one
stepchild was born of an extramarital relationship entered into
by the mother years after she separated from the
respondent/stepfather.14 While the stepparent scenario is
distinguishable from the surrogacy scenario since the
stepparent did not contractually arrange to bring the child into
the world, it should be noted that in reviewing this stepparent
situation the court similarly held that the biological parents
have the primary responsibility for the child.15
In the recent case of Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M,16 a same-sex
marital couple entered into an agreement whereby one of the
female spouses was inseminated with a donor’s sperm,
resulting in the birth of a child. The birth mother filed for
divorce. Her spouse (who is not biologically connected to the
child) sought access to the resulting child. Applying New York
13. Monroe Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. ex rel. Palermo v. Palermo, 596
N.Y.S.2d 252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
14. Id. at 253 (internal citations omitted).
15. Id.; see 46 N.Y. JUR.2D DOM. REL. § 901.
16. Wendy G-M v. Erin G-M, 985 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 2014).
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common law, the court held that she was presumed to be a
parent of the child conceived from artificial insemination and
born during the marriage of the same-sex couple, which
marriage had occurred in another state before New York
enacted its Marriage Equality Act.17 The court found that
“New York’s public policy strongly favors the legitimacy of
children, and the presumption that a child born to a marriage
is the legitimate child of both parents is one of the strongest
and persuasive known to law.”18 This case is distinguishable
from a surrogacy scenario in that it dealt with issues
pertaining to the legitimacy of children and, as such,
recognized parentage beyond biological ties to the resulting
child. However, the court did not make a determination on the
enforceability of the assisted reproduction agreement.
B. California Law
Contrary to New York, California recognizes the
enforceability of surrogacy contracts. California’s favorable
approach to surrogacy agreements is acknowledged in
surrogacy parenting agreement standardized forms which
contain a choice of law provision designating the applicability
of California for dispute resolution.19 In fact, such forms
oftentimes specifically reference the California Supreme
Court’s decision in Johnson v. Calvert.20
The Johnson v. Calvert case involves a gestational
surrogacy agreement where the egg is extracted from the
intended mother, sperm extracted from the intended father,
implanted into the surrogate, and thus the surrogate has no
biological connection to the child.21 After the birth, the
“husband and wife brought suit seeking declaration that they
were legal parents of child born of [a] woman in whom [the]
17. Id. at 858.
18. Id. at 848 (internal citations omitted).
19. See generally Sample Traditional Surrogacy Contract, SURROGATE
MOTHERS ONLINE, www.surromomsonline.com/articles/ts_contract.htm (last
visited Aug. 26, 2015).
20. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
21. Id.; see Jenn Z., Definitions and Types of Surrogacy, SURROGATE
MOTHERS ONLINE, http://www.surromomsonline.com/articles/define.htm (last
visited Aug. 26, 2015).
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couple’s fertilized egg had been implanted.”22 The trial court
held that husband and wife, as the biological and contractually
intended parents, were the legal parents of the resulting child,
and the surrogate had no parental rights to the child.23 The
surrogate appealed the trial court’s determination, which was
upheld by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth District and the
The Supreme Court of
Supreme Court of California.24
California’s decision examined the Uniform Parentage Act (the
“Act”), which was repealed in 1994 and replaced with
equivalent provisions in the Family Code.25 Under California
Family Code, a woman may establish maternity by proof of
genetics, child birth, or adoption.26 In applying this standard,
both the wife (as the egg donor) and the surrogate (as the childbearer) had legitimate maternity claims via genetics and child
birth respectively. The court broke this “tie” in favor of the
wife (as egg donor) who, prior to conception, was the intended
mother to raise and care for the child.27 In its ruling, the court
stated that surrogacy agreements are not inconsistent per se
with public policy, and recognized that the gestational
surrogacy agreement was a factor to be considered by courts
when determining parental rights under the circumstances
presented.28 The Johnson v. Calvert case “illustrates that
gestational surrogacy poses fewer legal risks because the
surrogate has no genetic tie to the child and consequently is
less likely to be granted custody if she revokes her consent.”29
It is important to recognize a key distinction between the
gestational surrogacy which was the subject of the Johnson v.
Calvert case versus Shepherd’s gestational surrogacy
22. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776.
23. Id. at 778.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 779 n.5 (“[e]ffective January 1, 1994, [California] Civil Code
sections 7000-7021 have been repealed and replaced with equivalent
provisions in the Family Code.”) (citing 1992 CAL. STAT. ch. 162, § 4); see CAL.
FAM. CODE §§ 7600-50 (West 1994)(effective Jan. 1, 1994).
26. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782; see CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7610[a], 7601[c],
7555 (West 2015).
27. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782.
28. Id. at 787.
29. Abigail Lauren Perdue, For Love or Money: An Analysis of the
Contractual Regulation of Reproductive Surrogacy, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& POL’Y 279, 284-85 (2011).
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arrangement.
The Johnson v. Calvert case involved a
gestational surrogacy agreement where the egg is extracted
from the intended mother, and thus the surrogate has no
biological connection to the child.30 Under such circumstances,
the court held that the legitimate maternity claims of Mrs.
Calvert as the genetic mother and intended mother under the
terms of the surrogacy parenting agreement prevailed. In
contrast, Sherri Shepherd’s gestational surrogacy arrangement
involved an egg donor who is the genetic mother, and a
surrogate who carried and delivered the child. This gestational
surrogacy scenario raises unique issues of parental rights
between the egg donor with a genetic tie to the child, the
intended mother who initiated the procedure which resulted in
the child, and the surrogate who carried and delivered the
child.
In re Marriage of Moschetta31 was a case of first impression
for the California Court of Appeals to determine parental
rights of a child born of a traditional surrogacy agreement after
the intended parents had separated. Pursuant to the parties’
traditional surrogacy agreement, the wife/intended parent had
no genetic tie to the child since the surrogate provided the egg
fertilized by the husband’s sperm and carried the child to term.
After the Moschettas took the child home, Mrs. Moschetta filed
for legal separation and sought a determination that she was
the ‘de facto mother’ entitled to custody of the child. The
surrogate joined in the proceeding also asserting parental
rights to the child.32 “At [the 1992] trial no party asked the
court to enforce the surrogacy contract; all agreed it was
unenforceable. At the time they did not have the benefit of
Johnson v. Calvert, which held that gestational surrogacy
contracts do not, on their face, offend public policy.”33 The trial
court deemed the surrogate the child’s legal mother. In the
wake of Johnson v. Calvert, Mr. Moschetta appealed that
determination. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s
30. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778.; see Jenn Z., Definition and Types of
Surrogacy, SURROGATE MOTHERS ONLINE, http://www.surromomsonline.com/
articles/define.htm (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
31. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (1994).
32. Id. at 895.
33. Id.
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determination that the biological surrogate mother was the
legal mother of the child, thus leaving the intended mother
Mrs. Moschetta without parental rights.34
The court
distinguished this case from Johnson v. Calvert since this case
did not have the conflicting legitimate maternity claims based
upon the Act’s standard factors; rather, the Moschettas’
surrogate was both the genetic mother and birth mother of the
resulting child and she did not consent to an adoption of the
child by the intended mother. Accordingly, the appellate court
held that it would be inappropriate to consider the validity of
the surrogacy agreement where the Act resolved the parentage
issue as the surrogate was both the genetic and birth mother of
the child.35
In 1998, the California appellate court reexamined related
issues in Buzzanca v. Buzzanca.36 The Buzzanca couple had an
embryo genetically unrelated to them arranged for in vitro
fertilization into a surrogate to carry to term. Prior to birth,
Mr. Buzzanca filed for divorce and sought no responsibility to
the child upon birth. The trial court held that the child had no
legal parents since the child had no connection by birth or
genetics.37 The appellate court overturned the trial court and
held that the Buzzanca couple were the legal parents, finding
that genetic connection was not determinative. Rather, the
court found that the parties’ intentions rendered the Buzzancas
the legal parents, thus Mr. Buzzanca was responsible to the
child upon birth.
The appellate court stated that the
Buzzancas initiated and consented to the procedure which
resulted in the birth of a child and, as such, are estopped from
denying their parental obligation to the child.38
34. Id. at 902-03; see Cynthia E. Fruchtman, Whose Pregnancy Is It?,
CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2013), https://ww2.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=NaN&
eid=926465&evid=1.
35. In re Moschetta, 830 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900-01; see RICHARD A. LORD, 7
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 16:22 (4th ed. 2010).
36. In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 283 (1998).
37. Id. at 282.
38. Elaine A. Lisko, California Appellate Court Holds Divorcing Spouses
Who Were Intended Parents of Child Resulting from Anonymous Egg and
Sperm Donors and Brought to Term by Surrogate to Be Legal Parents of
Child, HEALTH L. & POL’Y INST. (Apr. 8, 1998),
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/Reproductive/980408Child.ht
ml.
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In applying the current applicable laws in the State of
California, Sherri Shepherd could assert the position that her
gestational surrogacy arrangement is distinguishable from the
Johnson v. Calvert case since she is neither the genetic
biological mother nor the child-bearing mother, and her only
role was as a signatory to the surrogacy agreement. Her exhusband could rely on the Buzzanca holding to assert that he
and Sherri Shepherd were the intended parents under the
surrogacy agreement and thus are the legal parents
responsible for child support obligations, irrespective of the fact
that the intended mother (Sherri Shepherd) has no biological
connection to the child.39
C. Other States’ Laws Governing Surrogacy
Each state has varying approaches to surrogacy contracts.
Examples of states generally considered as favoring
enforceability of surrogacy agreements include California,
Illinois, Arkansas, Maryland, and New Hampshire.40 States
that deem surrogacy contracts as void and against public policy
include New York, Indiana, and Michigan.41 Some states, such
as Utah, favor enforcing only gestational surrogacy contracts,
while other states—such as Oklahoma—favor enforcing
surrogacy contracts which do not require compensation.42
Several states have not set forth any clear directives on the
issue.43

39. See In re Buzzanca, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282; see also Artificial
Insemination-Legal Aspects, CTR. FOR SURROGATE PARENTING, INC.,
http://www.creatingfamilies.com/intended-parents/
default.aspx?id=100&type=.
40. See Surrogacy Laws by Country, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Surrogacy_laws_by_country (last visited Aug. 26, 2015).
41. See Surrogacy Laws by State, ALL ABOUT SURROGACY (2013),
http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/surrogacylaws.htm; cf. Lisko, supra note
38.
42. Surrogacy Laws by State, supra note 41.
43. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/7

10

260

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:1

IV. Conclusion
Undoubtedly, the outcome of legal disputes involving the
enforceability of traditional surrogacy agreements depends on
which state’s court has jurisdiction over the matter. If New
York has jurisdiction, women who find themselves in Sherri
Shepherd’s position as the financial “breadwinner” spouse
could successfully argue that they have no child support or
other parental obligations pertaining to the resulting child of a
surrogacy agreement deemed unenforceable by Domestic
Relations Law § 122. The surrogate who carried and delivered
the child could likewise assert that she has no obligations to
the child resulting from the unenforceable surrogacy
agreement. Sherri Shepherd’s ex-husband and the egg donor,
as the biological parents, would likely retain parental rights
and bear the child support obligations for the resulting child.
On the other hand, if California has jurisdiction, the
determination of parental rights is more complicated. A litigant
who finds herself in Sherri Shepherd’s position could assert
that their gestational surrogacy agreement differs from the one
involved in the Johnson v. Calvert case in that the intended
mother has no connection to the child by genetics or child birth.
As such, it could be argued that the court should look to the egg
donor (as the genetic mother) and the surrogate (as the child
bearer) when determining parental rights and obligations to
the resulting child. Conversely, a litigant who finds themself
in Sherri Shepherd’s ex-husband’s position could rely on the
Buzzanca holding to assert that the surrogacy agreement is
enforceable and, accordingly, he and his ex-wife (as the
intended parents) should be deemed the legal parents of the
resulting child since they were personally responsible for
setting the medical procedures in motion to create their child,
irrespective of the fact that the intended mother has no genetic
connection to the child.
The potentially differing outcomes reveal a need for
further legislation in light of advances in reproductive
technology and in the interest of consistency. “Although
uniform approaches to surrogacy agreements have been
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suggested, none [of them] have been generally accepted.” 44
A. Post Script
Subsequent to the submission of this article for
publication, a Pennsylvania court obtained jurisdiction over the
Sherri Shepherd litigation. Following a hearing, the court held
that Sherri Shepherd, as the intended mother under the
surrogacy agreement, is the legal mother of the resulting child.
The ruling has implications on child support and parental
obligations which have yet to be resolved.45 Notwithstanding,
this article’s comparative analysis on New York and California
laws governing surrogacy and their applicability to similarlysituated persons remains relevant.

44. LORD, supra note 35, at n.29.
45. See Emily Strohm & Diane Herbst, Inside Sherri Shepherd’s
Surrogacy Ruling: What Happens Next, PEOPLE (Apr. 22, 2015, 2:30 PM),
http://www.people.com/article/sherri-shepherd-legal-mother-surrogate-babylamar-sally.
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